redeployment support teams. In Afghanistan, RAID’s dozen members were under the tactical command of the Army’s 831st Transportation Battalion. They were located at bases in Bagram, Kandahar, and Camp Leatherneck, which represented some of the most inland deployments of Coast Guardsmen, ever. RAID teams traveled to Army outposts. At each contingency or forward operating base, RAID teams instructed Army personnel regarding shipping and transportation matters. In late 2011, RAID’s portfolio expanded to include Marine Corps units at Camp Leatherneck, where a third of containers had failed inspections. The teams also worked closely with Australian, British, and Afghan national army troops, as well as personnel from other allied nations, and they deployed to other countries such as Kyrgyzstan and Oman. RAID teams were truly combat- oriented. The spartan and arduous conditions of Army and Marine Corps field life were a novel experience for these mariners. They lived in structures ranging from CONEX boxes, to tents, or “B-huts” (short for “military barracks hut”). At many locations, RAID team members had to run for the bunkers during periodic mortar attacks. They carried weapons at all times. They wore the desert camouflage uniform in certain areas until 2012, but as early as 2008 were authorized to wear the Army combat uniform or multicams (modern pixelated camouflage uniforms) when forward deployed. The teams kept busy with containers outloaded through Pakistan and longer routes in Central Asia. Here, under relatively stable conditions, RAID personnel inspected at a rate of 300 containers per month. The results of this work was very tangible; fees ran as high as $5,000 per day for cargo stranded in ports, which would have affected the military’s transportation costs. Add to that the savings enjoyed by reducing leased container numbers through recertification and corrective fixes. Indeed, the overall reduction in leased containers resulted in fee savings of $500,000 in the last quarter of calendar year 2011 for the Iraqi theater alone, with similar success seen in Afghanistan. By the time the U.S. withdrew from Iraq, the RAID team supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom and, later, Operation New Dawn, had inspected nearly 20% of all containers moved out of that country—a staggering 2.2 million pieces of equipment. Proud of its 100% record of availability, RAID contributed mightily to the return to the U.S. of nearly $7 billion worth of equipment. For example, RAID Team Seven noted in its after-action report that it had received 1,061 requests for support—all fulfilled. Thus, the redeployment process for much of the U.S. military forces overseas had been expedited through RAID’s expertise and hard work. The RAID teams conducted several types of inspections. Most of their work involved checking for structural seaworthiness, a primary activity. They also evaluated the structural integrity of the boxes, a process which included shutting themselves inside under blistering hot conditions to do light tests. Other inspections included those for proper loading and labeling of hazardous materials, examining and sealing of containers for customs border clearance, reviewing shipping credentials and, on occasion, enacting special procedures for rolling stock. RAID personnel were fully qualified for all of these inspections, ensuring proper packing and documentation and effecting minor repairs so containers met movement standards. Members also trained Army unit movement officers and hazardous materials certifiers in these skill sets. The RAID team was highly sought after by U.S. ground units because it facilitated the safe return home for troops and their equipment. With the first large departure of American forces in the spring of 2004 when 100,000 troops returned home, RAID was already an important contributor, inspecting some 435 containers weekly—a herculean achievement. It remained essential throughout the course of the war. During the last year of ground combat in Iraq, RAID’s activities reached a peak at the end of 2011, when the last 50,000 U.S. personnel departed Iraq along with 2.2 million pieces of cargo. Often there were problems, such as in 2013, when the Afghani government closed its borders to truck transports of American materiel to claw back an alleged $70 million in customs fines. During subsequent deployments in Afghanistan, the small RAID elements were just as busy as the teams in Iraq. RAID was a team in constant motion. Its services The author, Lt. Cmdr. Kent Sieg, USCGR (ret.), during a deployment to the Middle East. 38 RESERVIST � Issue 3 • 2021 were needed at bases both large and small, both forward and rear. More often than not, it was easier for a few RAID members to travel to these sites rather than sending containers to a centralized location. Personnel frequently journeyed to outlying forward
